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Thank you for the opportunity to provide a view on NATO’s possible contributions
to conflict management and conflict prevention or, to put it another way, to address
the framework and capabilities for crisis response operations within the Alliance.
"Give us the tools, and we will finish the job". Winston Churchill's famous words
may have been spoken in completely different circumstances over 60 years ago, during
the early days of the Second World War, but they aptly describe both the new situation
which the Alliance finds itself in and the reasoning behind the new Strategic Concept,
which was endorsed at the Washington Summit in April this year. 
As Director of the International Military Staff –the military staff through which
many of the political-military interests and decisions of the Alliance are pursued– I am
currently focused on ensuring the successful implementation of a variety of initiatives
stemming from the Washington Summit, which are all of relevance for this conference’s
theme “New challenges for European security”, and specifically in the case of Kosovo. 
THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND 
THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The Kosovo crisis was far from an ideal backdrop to the Summit, but it was a clear
sign of the challenges which the International Community will have to address within
the new world order.
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Highlighted against this background, it goes without saying that some truly
remarkable and timely achievements were made in Washington. 
Based on this, a new dynamic in preparing responses to future crises beyond the
North Atlantic Treaty Area is now rapidly evolving within the Alliance –and one can
look at our current operations in the Balkans as evidence of this development.
It is evident that numerous challenges face both KFOR and SFOR.
It is likely that the nature of the deployed forces will continue to change as the
situation develops. 
However, in both cases the concept of international military enterprises, led by
NATO, are likely to remain: 
Many Partner nations including Russia as well as non-Partner nations are
participating in both KFOR and SFOR.
Clear evidence that the building blocks of a truly international endeavour are
firmly in place.
THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE NEW CHALLENGES
As already alluded to, the current security situation in Europe is very different
from the situation, which prevailed during NATO’s first 40 years of existence. 
The threat of a superpower standing ready to overflow our borders has effectively
eroded over the past few years.
However, new risks are indeed identified or looming on the horizon:
The potential for instability in Russia and the associated concern with its military
capabilities, including nuclear weapons –not least in the longer term. 
Although Russia has a special relationship with NATO. Her ultimate aims within
this relationship are not necessarily in the true interest of the Alliance.
Her reactions prior to, during and after the Kosovo Crisis illustrate the problem. 
Ethnic, religious, political or economic instability (Balkans; Caucasus).
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
International terrorism and possibly organised crime.
These risks are indeed the reasons for which many nations have placed, and are
continuing to place, their trust in the unchallenged political and military strength of
the Alliance.
And even more countries would like to join the Club.
114
Allied Contribution
Afers Internacionals, 49
Consequently, these possible risks to stability are all taken into account in the new
continuum of missions for the Alliance’s military forces which can be derived from the
new Strategic Concept, ranging from daily cooperation activities with Partners over
peace support operations to collective defence. 
NATO's power has always resided with the individual member nations. Once
moved by the consultation mechanism and the decision-making process of the Alliance
towards consensus, I am sure you will agree the result is impressive –regardless which
type of mission they are set for.
Let me, however, at this point stress that the new Strategic Concept above all else
confirms NATO’s essential and well proved purpose: to safeguard the freedom and
security of its members by both political and military means. 
Collective defence, the transatlantic link and a stable security environment in
Europe remain the key elements of the Alliance’s military posture. 
On the other hand, as the traditional risk of major inter-state conflict between
nations in Europe gives way to other risks or potential future conflicts, the Alliance has
clearly accepted its unique capabilities and hence wider responsibilities within the
International Community. 
This is reflected in the current work within NATO to implement the many
decisions following the Washington Summit, involving:
New or improved ways to further peace, stability and security through international
cooperation.
Continued availability of capable military structures and forces for a full range of
eventualities. 
The Alliance has in fact –to quote a well-known Danish ship owner, Mr. Maersk
McKinney Moeller– accepted that “the body having the capability for doing a certain
job also has the responsibility for doing it”. 
With these broader perspectives and new initiatives as background, the tools needed
to do the job are now emerging and being molded into shape by NATO.
THE SUMMIT INITIATIVES
So, in short the Summit –in response to the prevailing geo-strategic situation–
laid the foundations for an integrated Alliance policy for the expansion of stability
through partnership and dynamic crisis management, which will be essential in the
pursuit of peace, stability and security in the next century. 
A number of initiatives resulted from The Washington Summit.
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The new initiatives: comprise i.a.; a new Strategic Concept; defence Capabilities
Initiative; enhanced and More Operational PfP; membership Action Plan; south East
Europe Initiative; provide fresh impetus for the member nations.
Are destined to meet the expectations of an even wider range of partners and nations.
Will hopefully convince former rivals of the mutual benefits to be gained through
joint missions and cooperative projects. 
THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The new Strategic Concept that came out of the Washington Summit recognises
that maintaining a strategic balance is no longer paramount in the current security
environment. 
In framing our future defence needs, we will continue to move away from the
former goal of achieving strategic parity, concentrating instead on the functional
characteristics and ‘sufficiency’ in military force needed for credible deterrence and
timely and effective crisis response operations. 
NATO's military intervention in Kosovo has shown that amid conflicting national
motivations and individual self-interest, NATO has the potential to be a catalyst for
progress that could lead the Alliance towards a wider concept for use of military force. 
Collective defence balanced with comprehensive crisis management tools –in other
words, blending self-defence with crisis response-related force projection– may well be
the key new dynamic resulting from the Washington Summit.
Kosovo is the proof that it is possible to generate the common will to achieve this goal.  
Admittedly, much remains to be done and the Alliance may not yet have all the
answers, but the crucial, initial building blocks are put in place. 
The Strategic Concept outlines the requirement for future military operations,
including crisis management responses. The actions to plan for are likely to be on a
smaller scale than the scenarios envisaged during the Cold War. But they may last
longer, in some cases require greater cooperation at lower levels of responsibility, and
take place concurrently with other operations. 
This change in the way the Alliance expects to work makes crucial new demands
on military forces and, specifically, the force structures that sustain them. 
The requirement to react with joint forces simultaneously in a variety of theatres
has already been partly addressed with the advent of the new NATO Command
Structure, which was activated this September –and which, by the way, resulted in the
standing up of JHQ SW in Madrid. 
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This structure provides for regional and subregional commands and flexible
combined and joint operations. 
However, the need to satisfy force levels and bring force structures into line, so
that we are able to react efficiently and effectively, remains the highest priority for the
Military Committee. 
Key words are the so-called functional “abilities”: flexibility; interoperability;
deployability; mobility; survivability; sustainability.
THE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE
The so-called Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) –another innovation of the
Washington Summit which aims to enhance NATO’s military capability– has the
potential of a breakthrough for the Alliance. 
Maintaining or obtaining forces with the necessary functionalities in an era of
rapid technological change is the purpose of DCI.
It addresses five key areas: deployment and mobility; sustainment and logistics;
effective engagement; survivability; CIS systems.
If successfully implemented, this initiative will spearhead greater effectiveness in
future multinational operations and will permeate the full spectrum of Alliance missions. 
Specifically, it will encourage cooperation at lower levels of responsibility and place
a special focus on interoperability between Alliance, Partner and other nations as they
operate in the field, whether it be in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or elsewhere. 
Operation Allied Force, the air campaign directed against Milosevic's forces,
showed that the military presently does have the potential to manage difficult crises–
even if they are of a very sensitive nature.
However, maintaining the necessary capabilities will be a major challenge in the
future. DCI is designed to ensure this, but the basic aims will only be met if nations
are ready to pay the bill linked with it.
COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS
Including Partners and non-Allied nations at every step of the way in the search
for solutions to the Kosovo crisis also set a new benchmark for international cooperation.
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The Enhanced and More Operational PfP entails many new initiatives, which
hopefully –in addition to the political aims– will ensure that the total pool of forces
available for Peace Support Operations increasingly improves.
However, there is a need to ensure that the number of initiatives are manageable.
There is a need to prioritise, not least because of scarce resources.
Developing Partner capabilities must not detract from the Alliance’s own military
credibility.
There is the Mediterranean Dialogue: a cooperation programme with Israel,
Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco is not actively participating
for the time being. The Dialogue is still in its embryonic stage. Military cooperation
is, however, developing, including i.a: courses; port calls by Standing Naval Forces;
NATO Military Authorities are considering ways to further improve the dialogue.
FACILITATING EUROPEAN 
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Special prominence was given at the Summit to the realisation that the Alliance
must continue to adapt to the requirements of the new security environment, especially
in Europe. 
With the realities of Kosovo unfolding in the background, Allied leaders agreed
to move forward and develop the core values of an increasingly flexible defensive posture
that would be able to react more swiftly to non-Article 5 crisis management needs
within a European context. 
This capability –which is at the heart of the concept for a European Security and
Defence Identity– is based on a re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship. It will
offer the prospect of effective European-led operations, supported by selected elements
of NATO assets and infrastructure. 
The new NATO Command Structure and the implementation of the so-called
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept will be among the military tools which
provide the basis for this initiative. 
All that remains –and that may well be a major challenge– is the resolve to muster
the political-military will within Europe to focus nations on a unified approach to
collective defence and crisis management. 
This will include providing the necessary military funds and thus the necessary
European-owned or common-funded capabilities.
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NATO HAS THE TOOLS TO DO THE JOB
All these Washington Summit initiatives stand to improve our crisis management
capabilities both prior to, during and after an actual crisis.
I view the developments stemming from the Summit with considerable optimism.
They will lead to: progress in force planning; changes to force structures; re-balancing
of force levels. 
This will ensure the ability to confront future threats to collective security, while
–on a case-by-case basis– remaining responsive and alert to the requirements of effective
crisis management beyond the NATO Treaty Area.
From a military standpoint the new Strategic Concept is a bold step forward and
–with the experience gained by the conflict in Kosovo– will ensure that NATO has
the wherewithal to evolve and to remain adequately equipped to cope with future risks. 
It is encouraging that these developments were broadly envisaged prior to
Washington. The Summit decisions aim to equip NATO even better for the present
and future challenges of an uncertain security environment, and the Allies have defined
the "tools" for the achievement of its missions. 
We are, as this brief description has intended to transmit, working hard to ensure
their delivery and get on with the job of moving the Alliance into the twenty-first century.
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